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NOTES
BREAKING BAD SCIENCE: DUE PROCESS
AS A VEHICLE FOR POSTCONVICTION
RELIEF WHEN CONVICTIONS ARE BASED
ON UNRELIABLE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
VINCENT P. IANNECE†
Whatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of the
phrase “due process of law,” there can be no doubt that it
embraces the fundamental conception of a fair trial, with
opportunity to be heard.1

INTRODUCTION
Picture this: A family man living with his wife, his two
young stepsons, and his six-month-old baby. While he was
putting away groceries, his stepsons went to the shed to play.
Minutes later, his neighbors alerted him that smoke was pouring
out of the shed and quickly turning to flames which consumed
the structure, killing both of his stepsons. Fire department
incendiary scientists indicated that the physical clues and the
results of scientific testing of the pour patterns undoubtedly
pointed to arson. That was all it took to successfully prosecute
this father and send him to prison for the rest of his life. His
only son was forced to grow up with the harsh reality that his
father is a murderer. Twenty-five years later, the field of fire
investigation advanced considerably and the evidence that was
instrumental in his conviction is now known to be fundamentally
unreliable. Experts reviewing his case found the pour and burn
patterns were simply evidence that the shed was subjected to
intense fire, and the toxicology report of the boys proved that the

†
Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., cum laude, 2015, St.
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2012, University of Pittsburgh.
1
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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fire was not started with gasoline as the medical examiner had
testified. Based on the current split of authority in federal circuit
courts, there is a possibility that this case may never be retried.2
Over the last fifty years, science has become crucial to the
investigation and prosecution of crime.3
Increasingly, the
solution of major crimes will turn on “the discovery at crime
scenes and subsequent scientific laboratory analysis of latent
fingerprints, weapons, footprints, hairs, fibers, blood, and similar
traces.”4 Such evidence can be admitted to satisfy the State’s
burden as to a particular element of a charge, to establish that
the defendant—and not some other individual—committed an
alleged crime or to prove that a crime has occurred. Proof of the
growing reliance on scientific evidence is exhibited by how
noteworthy its nonexistence has become.5
Regrettably, unreliable expert forensic science testimony has
been introduced into evidence and innocent people have been
wrongfully convicted due, at least in part, to its admission,
despite the Supreme Court’s requirement that only reliable
expert testimony be admitted.6 For many traditional types of
forensic science, “experts’ claims about their field, the authority
of their methodologies, and their own abilities have dramatically
outstripped what has actually been established by persuasive

2
This hypothetical is based on the conviction of Ed Graf. Dave Mann, The Arson
Files: After Serving 25 Years, Ed Graf May Finally Receive New Trial, OBSERVER,
Jan. 17, 2013, http://www.texasobserver.org/the-arson-files-after-serving-25-yearsed-graf-may-finally-receive-new-trial/.
3
Jennifer E. Laurin, Remapping the Path Forward: Toward a Systemic View of
Forensic Science Reform and Oversight, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (2013); see also
Paul C. Giannelli, The Twenty-First Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Scientific
Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions, 137 MIL. L. REV. 167, 167 (1992) (“Scientific and
expert evidence is playing an ever-increasing and far more important role in
criminal prosecutions than in the past.”).
4
Joseph L. Peterson & Anna S. Leggett, The Evolution of Forensic Science:
Progress amid the Pitfalls, 36 STETSON L. REV. 621, 624 (2007) (footnote omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
5
Giannelli, supra note 3, at 169; see Rorie Sherman, Technology, Emotion Key
in Jogger Case, 12 NAT’L L.J. 12 (1990) (“Among the defense’s strongest points in
attacking the prosecution’s case was the surprising absence of physical
evidence . . . .”).
6
Jane Campbell Moriarty, "Misconvictions," Science, and the Ministers of
Justice, 86 NEB. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2007); see Mark Hansen, Crimes in the Lab, A.B.A.
J., Sept. 2013, at 47 (noting that forensic lab scandals “have the potential to put
innocent people behind bars—or worse—and spawn litigation that could end up
costing taxpayers dearly”).
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research and careful study.”7 Forensic scientists frequently
testify in court to matters that are not as recognized or as certain
as they assert.8 These experts have exaggerated their level of
knowledge, underreported the probabilities of error, and
intimated greater confidence than is deserved.9 Too many
experts in the criminal justice system manifest a policeprosecution bias—a willingness to shade or distort opinions to
support the State’s claim—and too many prosecutors seek out
these experts.10 Furthermore, there has been far too little study
of how frequently forensic scientists make mistakes and when or
why these potential errors are more likely to occur.11
If
evidentiary inputs into our criminal justice system cannot be
trusted, neither should the outputs.12 Recent research suggests
that misleading and erroneous forensic science has been a
significant contributing factor in many wrongful convictions.13
In recent years, both the scientific community and state and
federal courts have increasingly acknowledged that flawed
forensic science is seriously affecting the integrity of our criminal
justice system.14 One of the most serious problems with forensic
science is that it is not unusual for forensic disciplines, once
considered reliable and routinely introduced at criminal trials, to
be partially or wholly discredited after more thorough scientific
evaluation is conducted. For example, courts once credited and
7
Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic Science,
75 BROOK. L. REV. 1209, 1209–10 (2010); see Hansen, supra note 6, at 46 (describing
that a review of a Minnesota crime lab “identified major flaws in nearly every aspect
of the lab’s operation, including dirty equipment, a lack of standard operating
procedures, faulty testing techniques, illegible reports, and a woeful ignorance of
basic scientific principles”).
8
Mnookin, supra note 7, at 1210.
9
Id.
10
Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The
Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 439, 441 (1997);
see Hansen, supra note 6, at 49–50 (describing an investigation that revealed
overwhelming evidence of pro-prosecution bias at a crime lab).
11
Mnookin, supra note 7, at 1210.
12
Id. at 1210–11.
13
See Hansen, supra note 6, at 47 (“[S]tudies show that unverified or improper
forensic science (defined as fraud, misconduct or the use of scientifically untested
evidence) played a role in about 55 percent of [DNA exonerations].”). See generally
Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009).
14
See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009) (cautioning that
“[s]erious deficiencies have been found in the forensic evidence used in criminal
trials”).

FINAL_IANNECE

198

10/7/2015 7:11 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:195

accepted such forensic techniques as hair microscopy,15
handwriting
analysis,16
bite-mark
comparisons,17
and
18
These techniques are now
comparative bullet lead analysis.
widely considered to be unreliable and no longer accepted by
some courts.19 Judge Cochran described this problem as a
“fundamental disconnect between the worlds of science and of
law” and opined:
This disconnect between changing science and reliable verdicts
that can stand the test of time has grown in recent years as the
speed with which new science and revised scientific
methodologies debunk what had formerly been thought of as
reliable forensic science has increased. The potential problem of
relying on today’s science in a criminal trial (especially to
determine an essential element such as criminal causation or
the identity of the perpetrator) is that tomorrow’s science
sometimes changes and, based upon that changed science, the
former verdict may look inaccurate, if not downright ludicrous.
But the convicted person is still imprisoned. . . . [f]inality of
judgment is essential in criminal cases, but so is accuracy of the
result—an accurate result that will stand the test of time and
changes in scientific knowledge.20

Compounding this problem is the fact that scientific evidence
has a uniquely persuasive impact on juries. In Reed v. State, the
court proclaimed that “[l]ay jurors tend to give considerable
15
See, e.g., Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1557–58 (E.D. Okla.
1995) (reversing a defendant’s death sentence and finding, in part, that admission of
“expert hair testimony at [appellant’s] trial was irrelevant, imprecise and
speculative, and its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect”).
16
See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554 (S.D. W. Va. 2002)
(excluding handwriting expert’s testimony for lack of reliability, noting that “[i]f
courts allow the admission of long-relied upon but ultimately unproven analysis,
they may unwittingly perpetuate and legitimate junk science”).
17
See, e.g., Ege v. Yukins, 380 F. Supp. 2d 852, 880 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (holding
that the decision to admit expert testimony that the defendant was the only possible
perpetrator in the Detroit metropolitan area, because of a bite mark on the murder
victim’s cheek, deprived the defendant of a fair trial in violation of her due process
rights, where such evidence was the only physical evidence linking the defendant to
the crime, and the testimony was unreliable and grossly misleading).
18
See, e.g., Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 580 (Ky. 2006)
(ordering a new trial for the defendant because the prosecution used the dubious
forensic technique of comparative bullet lead analysis).
19
See The Innocence Project, DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE
PROJECT (Feb. 7, 2007), http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/DNA_Exon
erations_Nationwide.php#.
20
Ex Parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446, 469–70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (Cochran,
J., dissenting).
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weight to ‘scientific’ evidence when presented by ‘experts’ with
impressive credentials.”21 A 1987 survey of recently discharged
jurors serving on criminal cases exposed that forensic experts are
the most persuasive trial witnesses.22 Moreover, approximately
one-quarter of these jurors indicated that they would have
instead come to a not guilty verdict had no scientific evidence
been presented.23 The research resulted in a finding that “the
[mere] presence of forensic science evidence, regardless of the
certainty with which it connects the defendant with the crime, is
predicted to result in higher rates of conviction.”24
The effect of forensic science on jurors has been amplified by
what legal scholars have referred to as the “CSI-Effect”25—the
idea that jurors confuse the romanticized portrayal of the
capabilities of forensic science on television with the actual
capabilities of forensic science in the current criminal justice
system.26 Prosecutors believe that jurors have become spoiled as
a result of these forensic television shows and now unrealistically
expect conclusive scientific proof of guilt before they convict.27
However, once this expectation has been satisfied, these same
jurors, as a result of these same forensic television shows, often
place too much weight on the forensic evidence, resulting in
convictions in cases where defendants probably should have been
acquitted.28 This has come to be known as the “Reverse
CSI-Effect,”29 and it may be more damaging to the criminal

21
Clemons v. State, 896 A.2d 1059, 1064 n.6 (Md. 2006) (quoting Reed v. State,
391 A.2d 364, 370 (Md. 1978)).
22
Tara Marie La Morte, Sleeping Gatekeepers: United States v. Llera Plaza and
the Unreliability of Forensic Fingerprinting Evidence Under Daubert, 14 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 171, 208 (2003).
23
Id. at 208–09.
24
Id. at 209.
25
The “CSI-Effect” refers to the theory that the popularity of shows like CSI has
spoiled jurors, and that they now unrealistically expect conclusive scientific proof of
guilt before they convict. Mark A. Godsey & Marie Alou, She Blinded Me With
Science: Wrongful Convictions and the “Reverse CSI-Effect,” 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 481, 481–82 (2011).
26
Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect:
Media and Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (2009).
27
Godsey & Alou, supra note 25, at 481.
28
Id. at 483.
29
The “Reverse CSI-Effect” refers to the theory that jurors, as a result of
CSI-type shows, often place too much weight on forensic evidence to the defendant’s
unfair detriment in cases where forensic evidence is in fact produced by the
prosecution. Id.
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justice system and the interest of justice than the CSI-Effect.30
One empirical study found forensic science errors in sixty-three
percent of all cases resulting in wrongful convictions.31 By
proffering scientific evidence, the State makes a special claim on
a jury’s trust because the scientific evidence offers a truth that
lay jurors cannot themselves draw from a set of facts.
The serious threat created by the “Reverse CSI-Effect” is
exemplified in several cases. In State v. Krone,32 a criminal
defendant was convicted of murder almost exclusively on the
basis of evidence offered by a forensic odontologist.33 The expert
conclusively testified that bite marks on the victim’s body
matched the defendant’s bite pattern.34 In fact, the expert’s
testimony was so convincing that the defendant was nicknamed
“the snaggletooth killer” by the press, and the jury found the
defendant guilty.35 However, Krone was completely exonerated
in 2002 after subsequent DNA testing revealed that the expert
testimony was simply wrong.36
The criminal justice system’s increasing dependence on
scientific evidence has produced a long and troubling line of
cases. These cases struggle with the problem of how to rectify
convictions premised upon expert testimony and scientific
evidence subsequently proven to be legally and scientifically
inaccurate or unreliable. The reliability of such evidence will
continue to face challenges and impugn existing—even
longstanding—convictions as new scientific discoveries and
revised methodologies improve the accuracy of forensic
testimony. Specifically, the cases that have addressed this issue
fall into three categories: (1) when an expert witness withdraws
earlier opinions offered at trial because of mistake or inaccuracy;
(2) where newly available evidence undermines expert testimony
from trial; and (3) when an expert willfully testifies falsely.

30

Id.
Michael J. Saks, Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obligations of Attorneys,
49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 421, 424 (2001).
32
897 P.2d 621 (Ariz. 1995).
33
Id. at 622.
34
Id.
35
See Flynn McRoberts, Bite-Mark Verdict Faces New Scrutiny; Release of Other
Death Row Inmate Prompts Arizona to Order DNA Tests, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 29, 2004,
at 1; see Krone, 897 P.2d at 622.
36
See McRoberts, supra note 35.
31
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This Note analyzes how the mandates of due process
influence the standard courts should apply in granting
postconviction relief to petitioners who were convicted based
upon scientific evidence that is later proven to be unreliable, yet
whose unreliability does not warrant full exoneration.
This Note argues that due process requires a new trial when
scientific evidence necessary to the conviction becomes so
unreliable as to call the validity of the jury’s verdict into
question. Part I of this Note discusses how scientific evidence is
admitted, the procedure for a convicted defendant’s
postconviction relief once that evidence is deemed unreliable, and
the constitutional protections that a convicted defendant is
afforded under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Part II of this Note examines the divide among
appellate courts as to whether the Due Process Clause requires a
new trial when a conviction is based on evidence that has later
been shown to be unreliable. Part III of this Note argues that
due process requires a new trial when scientific evidence in the
original trial is shown to be sufficiently unreliable as to
compromise confidence in the accuracy and integrity of the jury
verdict. A conviction later found to be based upon unreliable
scientific evidence deprives the defendant of a fundamentally fair
trial and thereby violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, under both procedural and substantive
due process theories, because it raises an intolerable risk of an
inaccurate verdict and undermines the integrity of the criminal
justice system. Because the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act impedes the rights of a petitioner to assert his or her
fundamental right to a fair trial, this Note argues that the
statute, as currently written and applied, should be found
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny review. A new trial will
ensure that innocent defendants do not fall victim to the inherent
shortcomings of the scientific evidence juries so readily embrace.
I.

OVERVIEW

This Part begins by examining various legal procedures to
define what federal courts find to be scientific knowledge and
provides a brief historical account of the standard to evaluate the
reliability and admissibility of the scientific theory and
technique. Next, it provides an overview of postconviction relief
procedures available to convicted defendants. Finally, it provides
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a background of the constitutional protections afforded to
convicted defendants under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
A.

The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence

The United States Supreme Court has declared that the trial
court has a gatekeeping obligation to determine whether the
explanative theory underlying every expert witness’s testimony,
regardless of whether based on scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge, is “reliable.”37 To reflect this, Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 was amended to require that the trial
judge, before permitting an expert to testify, determine that
“[(1)] the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; [(2)] the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
[(3)] the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case.”38 This Section examines the historical
development of the law governing the use of scientific evidence.
1.

The Frye General Acceptance Test

Commencing in the nineteenth century and lasting until the
start of the twentieth century, “the general standard for
determining the admissibility of expert testimony rested on the
assumption that experts had superior knowledge and training.”39
Courts accredited this capability to experts due to their
qualifications and success in their respective fields.40 Despite
there being no glaring problems with this standard, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Frye v. United States,41
pronounced a test for determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence.42
In Frye, the court stated that the trial judge must determine
whether the scientific evidence at issue had “gained general
acceptance in [its] particular field” to justify admitting the
37
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151–52 (1999); see also Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
38
FED. R. EVID. 702.
39
Leslie Morsek, Get on Board for the Ride of Your Life! The Ups, the Downs,
the Twists, and the Turns of the Applicability of the “Gatekeeper” Function to
Scientific and Non-Scientific Expert Evidence: Kumho's Expansion of Daubert, 34
AKRON L. REV. 689, 694 (2001).
40
Id. at 694–95.
41
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
42
Morsek, supra note 39, at 695.
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evidence.43 This standard required judges to discern which
scientific principles had achieved sufficient recognition and
which scientific principles had not.44 To facilitate this endeavor,
the court developed what is known as the “general acceptance”
test,45 which requires a two-part analysis: (1) identifying the field
in which the underlying principle falls,46 and (2) determining
whether the proffered evidence is generally accepted in that
field.47 The court articulated the general acceptance test as
follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult
to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force
of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a wellrecognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which
the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.48

This new analysis was “the first procedural barrier to the
admission of scientific evidence and expert testimony.”49 Because
this test excluded evidence not generally accepted in its
particular field, it impeded the introduction of novel evidence
that had not had time to gain acceptance in its respective field.50
This inability to utilize new theories demonstrates the difficulties
in devising the proper test for determining the admissibility of
expert testimony.51

43

See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
Morsek, supra note 39, at 696.
45
Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1200 (1980).
46
See People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 708, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368 (Sup. Ct.
Kings Cnty. 1978) (“At the threshold of determining whether the technique meets
the test of acceptance in the scientific community, is the question of defining that
community.”); see also Giannelli, supra note 45, at 1208–10.
47
See Giannelli, supra note 45, at 1210–11.
48
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
49
Morsek, supra note 39, at 698.
50
Id. at 699.
51
Id. at 699–700.
44
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The Federal Rules of Evidence

In 1975, the codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence
presented an opportunity to illuminate the contention
surrounding the admissibility of scientific evidence.52 Under the
Federal Rules, however, the basic relevancy standard in Rule 702
came into conflict with the general acceptance standard of Frye.53
Although most federal courts followed the Frye standard prior to
the adoption of the Federal Rules, the Rules were silent as to
whether the general acceptance test had been superseded.54
Those who believe that the Frye test should still apply after
the Federal Rules were enacted found some support in the
legislative history.55 They claimed that, because Frye was the
established rule and no statement repudiating Frye appeared in
the legislative history, the general acceptance standard remained
intact.56
Proponents of repealing the Frye standard emphasized the
text of the Federal Rules. They claimed that, “[b]ecause scientific
evidence could be shown to be reliable and thus relevant under
Rule 401 without regard to its general acceptance in the scientific
community, and because none of the exclusions enumerated in
Rule 402 [were] applicable, the Federal Rules have provided a
standard of admissibility inconsistent with Frye.”57
In the early 1990s, legal scholars began to question the
standard of admissibility for scientific evidence because of these
differences of opinion.58 In response to the inconsistencies, the
United States Supreme Court ultimately pronounced a formal
standard for admitting expert evidence.59

52
Kaushal B. Majmudar, Daubert v. Merrell Dow: A Flexible Approach to the
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 187, 198 (1993).
53
Andre A. Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence in the PostDaubert World, 66 UMKC L. REV. 251, 273 (1997).
54
Giannelli, supra note 45, at 1229.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 1230.
58
Carrie C. Coppage, Note, The Revolution of the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence with Print Identification Evidence as a Model, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 609,
612 (2001).
59
Morsek, supra note 39, at 703.
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The Daubert Declaration

In 1993, the United States Supreme Court, in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,60 declared that the Frye
general acceptance test did not survive the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.61 Specifically, the Supreme Court
imposed a new obligation that, with respect to the admission of
scientific evidence, requires the trial judge under Rules 702 and
104(a) to act as a gatekeeper in screening scientific evidence to
ensure both relevancy and reliability.62
The Court stated that although the Federal Rules of
Evidence displaced Frye, the Rules themselves do not place limits
on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence.63
However, the fact that the judge must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is both relevant and
reliable contemplates some degree of regulation of the subjects
and theories about which an expert may testify.64 Accordingly,
the court said:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the
trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule
104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific
knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or
determine a fact in issue.
This entails a preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue.65

While the Supreme Court did not articulate a “definitive
checklist or test,” the justices did identify five non-exclusive
factors to aid in determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence: (1) whether the theory or scientific technique “can be
(and has been) tested”; (2) whether it has been “subjected to peer
review and publication”; (3) “the known or potential rate of
error”: (4) “the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique’s operation”; and (5) whether the
principle was generally accepted in the relevant scientific
60

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
See id. at 587 (“[T]he Frye [general acceptance] test was superseded by the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
62
See id. at 589–92.
63
Id. at 589.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 592–93.
61
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community.66 The Court stated that the analysis intended by
Rule 702 is a “flexible one,” and “[i]ts overarching subject is the
scientific validity and thus the evidentiary relevance and
reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed
submission.”67 The focus of the Rule 702 analysis must be
exclusively on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions
they produce.68
While Daubert did suggest that the trial judge take on a
gatekeeping function to prevent “unreliable” evidence from being
admitted, it was unclear whether such screening was to always
be exercised, or if it applied only to “novel” scientific evidence.69
Because of the ambiguity in Daubert, federal courts struggled
with these questions each time they were presented with nonscientific expert evidence.70
4.

The Kumho Tire Answer

In 1999, the United States Supreme Court answered the
questions left unresolved by Daubert in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael.71 The Supreme Court held that the gatekeeping
obligation articulated in Daubert should apply to both testimony
based on “scientific” knowledge and testimony based on
“technical” and “other specialized” knowledge.72 In exercising its
“gatekeeping” function, the trial court may, on the condition that
doing so will help determine if the testimony is reliable, consider
one or more of the five specific factors listed in Daubert.73 Kumho
instructs that the test of reliability is “flexible” and that
“Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor
exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.”74 Rather, the
court must look for a reliable basis in the knowledge and
experience of the relevant discipline and “the same level of
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in
the relevant field.”75
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Id. at 593–94.
Id. at 594–95.
Id. at 595.
Coppage, supra note 58, at 614.
Morsek, supra note 39, at 711–12.
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Id. at 141 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 149–52.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 152.
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The 2000 Amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence

In 2000, Rule 702 was amended in response to the Daubert
and Kumho Tire decisions.76 The rule now states that an expert
may testify if “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data”;
“the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods”;
and “the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods
to the facts of the case.”77 Thus, the amendment affirms the trial
court’s gatekeeping function and “provides some general
[principles] that the trial court must use to assess the reliability
and helpfulness of proffered expert testimony.”78 Consistent with
Kumho Tire, the amended Rule “provides that all types of expert
testimony present questions of admissibility for the trial court.”79
As a result, the admissibility of expert testimony is regulated by
Rule 104(a), which places the burden of establishing the
pertinent admissibility requirements by a preponderance of the
evidence on the proponent.80
Furthermore, by not codifying the specific factors articulated
in Daubert, the amendment allowed trial courts to determine
which factors were pertinent to reliability in each case.81
However, it is clear that the amendment was not intended to
overrule Daubert because the Daubert factors are still pertinent
to resolving the issues raised when the expert offers an opinion
in an area of science.
When convictions are based upon scientific evidence later
shown to be unreliable, the foundations for the conclusions
scientists made to help convict an individual have been
undermined. Had this new scientific knowledge been known to

76

DAVID P. LEONARD ET. AL., EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH 539 (2d ed.

2008).
77

FED. R. EVID. 702(b)–(d).
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
LEONARD ET. AL., supra note 76. In fact, the Advisory Committee’s Note to
Rule 702 lists other factors that courts have found “relevant in determining whether
expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact,”
including: (1) whether experts have developed their opinions naturally out of their
own research independent of litigation, or have done so expressly for purposes of
testifying, (2) whether there is too big of an analytical gap between the data and the
opinion offered, (3) whether the expert has considered all relevant variables,
(4) whether the expert brings the same rigor to the courtroom as he would in his
regular work, and “(5) whether the field of expertise . . . is known to reach reliable
results.” FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note.
78
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the trial court, it is unlikely that the expert testimony would
have been admitted into evidence at trial. Because the jury
should have never seen the evidence they based the conviction
on, postconviction remedies must be available to the convicted
defendant.
B.

Postconviction Remedy Procedure

A judgment of conviction rendered at the end of a criminal
trial does not necessarily dispose of the case. Not only do
American jurisdictions permit recourse to direct review of
convictions for most offenses, but they all also permit the
defendant to attack his conviction through postconviction
remedies.82 Generally, “[d]irect appeals [] can be made on the
basis of ‘any nonharmless legal error,’ whereas postconviction
appeals are typically allowed only on the basis of more egregious
(such as constitutional or jurisdictional) error.”83
Federal prisoners have had postconviction relief available to
them since the Judiciary Act granted federal courts the authority
to issue writs of habeas corpus.84 However, habeas relief was
limited to only federal prisoners under the Act,85 and even though
the Act did not announce the substantive scope of the writ, courts
understood it to apply to jurisdictional challenges.86 Under the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867,87 Congress broadened the
implementation of habeas corpus to include state prisoners,88 but
courts continued to look upon the writ as a mere jurisdictional
tool.89 But in the 1930s and 1940s, “courts began to expand the
scope of habeas corpus to permit challenges to nonjurisdictional
flaws such as violations of due process, the right to counsel, and
other constitutional rights.”90
Both direct appeals and
postconviction appeals should be available to defendants
convicted based upon scientific evidence that has later been
found to be unreliable.
82

Note, State Post-Conviction Remedies, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 681 (1961).
Terrell J. Iandiorio, Note, Federal Postconviction Relief and 28 USC § 2255(4):
Are State Court Decisions “Facts”?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1141, 1141 (2004).
84
Id. at 1143–44; see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82.
85
See § 14, 1 Stat. at 82.
86
Iandiorio, supra note 83, at 1144.
87
ch. 27, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
88
§ 1, 14 Stat. at 386.
89
Iandiorio, supra note 83, at 1144.
90
Id.
83
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The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

In 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”) was adopted.91 Congress enacted the AEDPA to
modify the pre-existing habeas process.92 Although the AEDPA
was created for many different reasons, its paramount purpose
was to decrease the death penalty process so that inmates could
be put to death in a more timely manner.93
One significant change under the AEDPA has affected the
rule demanding that a state prisoner exhaust all state remedies
before seeking federal review.94 This rule has been modified in
two respects: (1) “the federal courts are now authorized to deny a
petition on the merits even though the issues have not been
exhausted,” and (2) “the federal courts are not permitted to infer
state waiver of the exhaustion requirement from lack of response,
although the state may still affirmatively waive the
requirement.”95
Under the language of the AEDPA, relief may be granted
only if state court adjudication of the issues “resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
Factual
the Supreme Court of the United States.”96
determinations made by state courts continue to be presumed
correct and under the Act may now be rebutted only by “clear
and convincing evidence.”97
Federal habeas corpus is not an ordinary remedy, and by no
means should it be used to re-litigate state criminal dispositions
on a regular basis.98 State courts’ findings of fact and legal
conclusions have been given great deference under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d).99
However, the AEDPA was enacted to provide
91
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(2012).
92
Kenneth Williams, Why It Is so Difficult to Prove Innocence in Capital Cases,
42 TULSA L. REV. 241, 246 (2006).
93
Id.
94
F. Martin Tieber, Federal Habeas Corpus Law and Practice—The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 77 MICH. B.J. 50, 51–52
(1998).
95
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)–(3) (2012); Tieber, supra note 94, at 52.
96
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
97
§ 2254(e)(1).
98
Tieber, supra note 94, at 52.
99
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997) (stating that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) dictates a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings”).
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limitations on state courts.100
Therefore, by limiting the
procedural and substantive scope of the writ of habeas corpus,
the AEDPA has made it even more challenging for potentially
innocent inmates to obtain justice.101
C.

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that minimally fair due process must be provided to
those deprived by the government of life, liberty, or property, as
long as the amount of process sought does not outweigh the
associated costs, risk of error, and adverse impact on the
government.102 The theory of due process is not intended to be a
“technical conception with a fixed content.”103 Instead, it is
meant to be flexible104 and “adaptable to the exigencies of a
particular factual context.”105
Convictions secured using false and unreliable evidence,
even scientific evidence, do not automatically give rise to a
challenge under the Due Process Clause. Instead, the Supreme
Court has recognized that, in most situations, other core
constitutional protections suffice to protect a defendant against a
conviction secured through such evidence by providing a real and
meaningful opportunity to expose the flaws in the evidence in
question.106 The Court has stated the following:
The Constitution, our decisions indicate, protects a defendant
against a conviction based on evidence of questionable
reliability, not by prohibiting introduction of the evidence, but
by affording the defendant means to persuade the jury that the
evidence should be discounted as unworthy of credit.

100
101
102

Tieber, supra note 94, at 52.
Williams, supra note 92, at 248.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335

(1976).
103
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union Local
473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)); see Melissa Duncan, Finding a
Constitutional Right to Access DNA Evidence: Postconviction, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 519,
538 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104
McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (“It is axiomatic that
due process ‘is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.’ ”)); see Duncan, supra note 103.
105
Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 243 (D. Mass. 2006); see Duncan, supra
note 103.
106
See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 723 (2012).
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Constitutional safeguards available to defendants to counter the
State’s evidence include the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel;
compulsory process; and confrontation plus cross-examination of
witnesses.107

These protections generally suffice to adequately protect a
defendant and, therefore, obviate the need for further court
intervention. When marshaled effectively, they ensure that the
jury is provided with, and can fully consider, the flaws and
potential errors in the challenged evidence.108
The Court in Perry v. New Hampshire109 recognized,
however, that circumstances exist in which these safeguards may
prove inadequate, requiring intervention by the courts.110 The
Seventh Circuit has stated:
Our Constitution protects against conviction[s] based on
evidence of questionable reliability. Despite the importance of
this right, the admission of evidence rarely implicates due
process. Rather, courts typically rely on other means to ensure
reliable evidence—state and federal rules, as well as different
constitutional guarantees, such as the Sixth Amendment rights
to counsel and confrontation.
Yet, when evidence is so
extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental
conceptions of justice, due process, like the sleeping giant,
awakens. In those situations, other protections have proven
insufficient, and courts must step in to prevent injustice.111

While the interest in fundamental fairness is an essential
step in a due process analysis, the Court has found that “[d]ue
[p]rocess does not require that every conceivable step be taken,
irrespective of cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an
innocent person.”112 However, due process does serve to protect
against baseless deprivations of liberty at the hands of
government officials by “barring certain government actions

107

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 729 (noting that defense counsel cautioned the jury during both
opening and closing arguments regarding the potential errors in the challenged
evidence and explored these potential errors and flaws during cross-examination).
109
132 S. Ct. 716.
110
See id. at 723 (“Only when evidence ‘is so extremely unfair that its admission
violates fundamental conceptions of justice,’ have we imposed a constraint tied to the
Due Process Clause.”) (citations omitted).
111
United States v. Sanders, 708 F.3d 976, 983 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations
omitted) (quoting Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 723) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112
Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 246 (D. Mass. 2006) (quoting Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108
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regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them.”113 The standards of fundamental fairness “legitimately
draw[] upon the principles that underlay the [established]
categories of procedural and substantive due process.”114
1.

Procedural Due Process

Procedural due process requires that the government may
not deprive a person of life, liberty, or property unless
fundamentally fair and free from arbitrariness.115
This
requirement of fundamental fairness “prohibits the State from
depriving its citizens of liberty in a criminal trial unless it first
observes certain procedural safeguards.”116 Failure to comply
with clearly delineated procedures will result in a “deprivation of
liberty without due process of law.”117
To declare a violation of procedural due process, a person
seeking relief must first demonstrate that he retains a life,
liberty, or property interest in the right the government seeks to
eliminate.118 A court must then balance certain factors to
determine if there has been a violation of procedural due
process.119 In Matthews v. Eldridge,120 the Court articulated a
balancing test to determine whether the government’s actions
deprived a person of a life, liberty, or property interest without
due process of law.121 The test requires a balancing of the
following factors in order to determine whether procedural due
process requires constitutional safeguards:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and

113
Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998) (quoting Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114
See Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 311 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J.,
concurring); see also Duncan, supra note 103.
115
See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976); see Duncan, supra
note 103.
116
Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 677 (4th Cir. 2000) (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting).
117
Id.; see Duncan, supra note 103, at 538–39.
118
See McKithen v. Brown, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440, 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
119
See Duncan, supra note 103, at 539.
120
424 U.S. 319.
121
Id. at 334–35.
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finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.122

2.

Substantive Due Process

The Court has stated that prisoners lawfully deprived of
their freedom retain substantive liberty interests under the
Furthermore, “[s]ubstantive due
Fourteenth Amendment.123
process protects against deprivations of liberty where the state
has no sufficient interest to justify the deprivation, regardless of
the process that might be employed.”124 The primary function of
substantive due process is to protect individuals from practices
that are “contrary to contemporary standards of decency,”
“shocking to the conscience,” or contrary to a “principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.”125
There are two primary features of judicial review in the
realm of substantive due process analysis: (1) identification of a
fundamental right or liberty interest that is “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition,” and “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,”126 and (2) “a careful description of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest,” using the first prong as a
guidepost.127 These requirements emphasize the level of care
necessary in “defining the interests at stake in substantive due
process analysis because, in determining a statute’s
constitutionality, the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied
depends on the nature and quality of the activity that the statute
seeks to address.”128
122

Id. at 335.
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (“The mere fact that
[petitioner] has been committed under proper procedures does not deprive him of all
substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
124
Michael Avery, Paying for Silence: The Liability of Police Officers Under
Section 1983 for Suppressing Exculpatory Evidence, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 1, 24 (2003).
125
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 419 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172 (1952).
126
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
127
Id. at 721 (internal quotation marks omitted).
128
Craig M. Jacobs, The Constitutionality of Collateral Post-Conviction Claims
of Actual Innocence, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 455, 477–78 (2011); see Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 722.
123
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If an act of Congress infringes upon a liberty interest deemed
fundamental, the appropriate level of review is strict scrutiny; if
the act infringes upon a lesser liberty interest, then rational
basis scrutiny generally applies.129
When a statute or
government action infringes upon a right that does not rise to the
fundamental level but is in some way constitutionally suspect,
the court applies intermediate level scrutiny.130
Thus,
substantive due process analysis requires identifying the nature
of the liberty interest asserted to determine the appropriate level
of judicial review.
Both federal and state courts disagree as to whether the Due
Process Clause requires a new trial when a conviction is based
upon science later shown to be unreliable. In particular,
appellate courts are divided as to whether, in order to obtain a
new trial, it suffices that the tainted expert testimony likely
affected the trial’s outcome or whether a convicted defendant
must affirmatively disprove the expert’s opinion. In order to
decide the appropriate standard, each must be analyzed under
both substantive and procedural due process.
II. THE DIVERGENT STANDARDS AMONG APPELLATE COURTS IN
AFFORDING A CONVICTED DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL WHEN A
CONVICTION IS BASED ON UNRELIABLE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Notwithstanding the growing use of scientific evidence in
criminal cases and the influence that such evidence has on the
outcome of a trial, appellate courts lack uniformity in
approaching wrongful conviction claims based on the use of false
or unreliable scientific evidence. This Part discusses the division
among appellate courts as to whether, in order to obtain a new
trial, it suffices that the tainted expert testimony likely affected
the trial’s outcome or whether a convicted defendant must
affirmatively disprove the expert’s conclusion.
Section A
discusses the reasonable probability standard—that courts are
willing to grant relief when scientific evidence in the original
trial is shown to be sufficiently unreliable as to undermine
confidence in the accuracy and integrity of the jury verdict.
Section B discusses the actual innocence standard—that courts
129
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593–94 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (discussing when the strict scrutiny test applies and when the rational
basis test applies).
130
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189–90 (1997).
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require a defendant who challenges scientific evidence as
unreliable to proffer additional, exculpatory evidence that
affirmatively demonstrates that the expert testimony was
actually false, or that the defendant was innocent of the crime.
A.

The Reasonable Probability Standard

Some appellate courts that have heard wrongful conviction
claims based on the use of scientific evidence that was later
found to be fundamentally unreliable have taken a less
restrictive approach than others. These courts are willing to
grant relief when scientific evidence in the original trial is shown
to be sufficiently unreliable as to undermine confidence in the
accuracy and integrity of the jury verdict.131
For example, in Han Tak Lee v. Glunt,132 the defendant was
convicted of first degree murder and arson, and sentenced to life
without the possibility of parole after his twenty-year-old
mentally ill daughter died in a cabin fire.133 The defendant
sought federal habeas relief claiming that advances in the field of
arson science demonstrated that the expert testimony offered
against him at his original trial was fundamentally unreliable.134
The district court denied the petition after concluding “claims of
actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence are never
grounds for federal habeas relief absent an independent
constitutional violation.”135
On appeal, the Third Circuit
reversed the holding that the defendant was entitled to discovery
and an opportunity to present his newfound evidence at an
evidentiary hearing in order to ascertain whether the original
trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by use of the unreliable
expert testimony.136
The court concluded that “[i]f [the
defendant’s] expert’s independent analysis of the fire scene

131
See, e.g., Han Tak Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 403–04 (3d Cir. 2012); United
States v. Freeman, 650 F.3d 673, 678–80 (7th Cir. 2011); Drake v. L.A. Portuondo,
553 F.3d 230, 233 (2d Cir. 2009); State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590, 598–99 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2008); State v. Krone, 897 P.2d 621, 621 (Ariz. 1995); State v. Gookins, 637
A.2d 1255, 1259 (N.J. 1994); In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab.,
Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 504 (W. Va. 1993); State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574,
587 (Minn. 1982).
132
667 F.3d 397.
133
Id. at 400.
134
Id. at 402.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 403–04.
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evidence—applying principles from new developments in fire
science—shows that the fire expert testimony at [the defendant’s]
trial was fundamentally unreliable, then [the defendant] will be
entitled to federal habeas relief on his due process claim.”137
In United States v. Freeman,138 four defendants were
convicted of various drug crimes.139 However, the district court
ultimately decided that “the government’s star witness had
testified falsely, that the government knew this testimony was
false, and that the government relied upon it to secure the
defendants’ convictions.”140 The Seventh Circuit held that, before
granting a new trial on due process grounds, it need not “be
conclusively established that the . . . witness was lying.”141 In
fact, the court squarely rejected the suggestion that a defendant
must prove that the challenged evidence was verifiably false in
order to trigger due process relief.142 The Seventh Circuit
explained that there “does not need to be conclusive proof that
the testimony was false” for the testimony to constitute a due
process violation.143
In Drake v. Portuondo,144 the prosecution offered the
testimony of a prison psychologist to establish that the defendant
had the requisite intent to commit murder.145 The expert
testified that the facts of the case led him to conclude that the
defendant
suffered
from
picquerism—“a
purported
syndrome . . . in which the perpetrator realizes sexual
satisfaction from penetrating a victim by sniper activity or by
stab or bite wounds,” and the jury convicted the defendant on two
counts of second degree murder.146 In a habeas petition, the
convicted defendant established that the expert had lied on the
stand regarding his credentials, when he learned about the facts
of the case, and how and when he concluded that the defendant
suffered from picquerism.147 The court determined that the

137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Id. at 407–08.
650 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2011).
See id. at 675.
Id.
Id. at 679–80.
See id.
Id. at 680.
553 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2009).
See id. at 236.
Id. at 235, 237.
Id. at 237–39.
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expert’s conclusions were not based on reliable science, that the
prosecutor knew that at least some of the expert’s testimony was
false, and that the defendant was entitled to a new trial.148 The
court did not, however, require the defendant to disprove the
expert’s conclusions regarding picquerism or to prove that the
defendant lacked the requisite intent for the crime.
In State v. Edmunds,149 the defendant was convicted of
reckless homicide of an infant after expert medical testimony at
trial suggested the infant’s injuries could only be explained by
shaken baby syndrome.150 During postconviction proceedings,
Edmunds presented expert testimony from multiple doctors
revealing a newly developed debate in the medical community
that undermined the testimony of the state’s expert trial
witness.151 Although it found that “the new evidence d[id] not
completely dispel the old evidence,” the court nonetheless found
that a new trial was warranted because “the record establishes
that there is a reasonable probability that a jury, looking at both
the new medical testimony and the old medical testimony, would
have a reasonable doubt as to Edmunds’s guilt.”152
In In re Investigation of the West Virginia State Police Crime
Laboratory, Serology Division,153 the West Virginia court
appointed a circuit judge to conduct an investigation into
whether habeas relief should be granted to prisoners whose
convictions were obtained through the testimony of a former
serologist who was alleged to have engaged in systematic
misconduct, including the falsification of evidence in criminal
prosecutions.154 The investigation concluded that the serologist’s
“pattern and practice of misconduct completely undermined the
validity and reliability of any forensic work he performed or
reported . . . .”155 Although the report did not disprove the
serologist’s conclusion in every trial in which his testimony was
offered, the court held that all of his testimony should be deemed
false, and thus “in any habeas corpus hearing involving [the
serologist’s] evidence, the only issue is whether the evidence
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Id. at 243–44, 247–48.
746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 592–93.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 599.
438 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1993).
Id. at 502–03.
Id. at 504.
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presented at trial, independent of the forensic evidence presented
by [the serologist], would have been sufficient to support the
verdict.”156 Therefore, the court held that due process required a
new trial for defendants who were convicted based on the
serologist’s evidence if such evidence “could . . . in any reasonable
likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury . . . .”157
Finally, in State v. Gookins,158 three defendants arrested for
drunk driving declared they were innocent but pleaded guilty
when
they
were
presented
with
breathalyzer
blood-alcohol-concentration readings in excess of .10 percent.159
After their pleas, an undercover operation resulted in the
conviction of the arresting officer on charges of falsifying the
results of a breathalyzer test on an undercover agent.160 The
three defendants moved for new trials based on the officer’s
conviction, but the Municipal Court denied the motions.161 The
Law Division and the Appellate Division of New Jersey upheld
the Municipal Court’s decision because the charges against the
arresting officer did not relate to the tests performed on the three
defendants who pleaded guilty, and thus did not establish
falsification of evidence in any of their cases.162 The three
defendants were unable to prove that the officer falsified the
results in their own cases and that they were actually innocent.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed that decision and
remanded the cases to the municipal court where the State would
be required “to prove defendants’ guilt with evidence that is free
of the taint of [the officer’s] pattern of misconduct.”163
These courts hold that due process can be violated by the use
of testimony or evidence whose validity has been seriously called
into question, even where it has not necessarily been recanted or
wholly discredited. In doing so, these courts equate “false”
evidence with unreliable or discredited evidence. Thus, under
the reasonable probability standard, a convicted defendant
should be granted relief when he can show that scientific

156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id. at 506.
Id. at 505 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959)).
637 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 1994).
Id. at 1256.
Id. at 1257.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1260.
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evidence in the original has later been shown to be sufficiently
unreliable as to undermine confidence in the accuracy and
integrity of the jury verdict.
B.

Actual Innocence Standard

The actual innocence standard that other appellate courts
have adopted requires a defendant who challenges scientific
evidence as unreliable to proffer additional, exculpatory evidence
to affirmatively demonstrate that the expert testimony was
actually false, or to demonstrate his or her actual innocence of
the crime.164 These courts hold that due process is not violated
merely because an individual is convicted using evidence or
testimony that was later found to be unreliable and thus misled
the jury into reaching a guilty verdict.
For example, in United States v. Berry,165 the petitioner
claimed that his due process rights were violated because his
conviction was based largely on expert testimony that had been
subsequently found to be unreliable.166 The petitioner had
originally been convicted, in part, on the basis of “compositional
analysis of bullet lead” evidence.167 Following the petitioner’s
conviction, the FBI discontinued the use of compositional
analysis of bullet lead evidence because it was determined to be
inaccurate.168 Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the
expert testimony suffered from “significant criticisms,” the court
denied relief because the petitioner failed to show that the
evidence was “almost entirely unreliable.”169
In Fuller v. Johnson,170 a defendant was sentenced to death
for robbery, murder, and sexual assault.171 The defendant
initially confessed that he committed the crimes alone, but at
trial, he recanted his confession and posited that an accomplice

164
See United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010); Byrd v.
Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 517–18 (6th Cir. 2000); Fuller v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 491, 496–
97 (5th Cir. 1997); Ex Parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446, 458–60 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011); Trotter v. State, 736 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
165
624 F.3d 1031.
166
Id. at 1039–40.
167
Id. at 1035–36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
168
See id. at 1037.
169
Id. at 1041 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170
114 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 1997).
171
See id. at 494.
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actually killed the victim with a pipe.172 To challenge the
defendant’s allegations, the prosecution presented autopsy
evidence from a medical professional showing that the victim’s
injuries indicated she was killed with blows from a fist, not a
pipe.173 Following his conviction, the defendant filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus arguing that his due process rights
were violated because his conviction was based on false
testimony.174 In support, the defendant submitted an affidavit
from another medical professional who stated that the trial
expert did not perform the scientific procedures necessary to
make the conclusions presented to the jury.175 The district court
denied the petition and the Fifth Circuit affirmed because the
defendant did not show that the expert’s opinion was “actually
false.”176
Similarly, in Byrd v. Collins,177 the petitioner also claimed
his due process rights were violated when he was convicted with
allegedly false testimony.178 The petitioner had originally been
convicted and sentenced to death for aggravated murder.179 In
his federal application for a writ of habeas, the petitioner
presented evidence to show that witnesses from his original trial
were “involved in a scheme to testify falsely against [him] in
order to further their own causes with the . . . [p]rosecutor’s
[o]ffice.”180 However, the Sixth Circuit denied relief because the
petitioner failed to show that the statements were “indisputably
false” rather than merely misleading.181
In Ex Parte Robbins,182 the petitioner was convicted of capital
murder of his girlfriend’s seventeen-month-old child and was
sentenced to imprisonment for life.183 The State’s case largely
depended on the expert opinion of a medical examiner who
performed the autopsy and who testified that the child died from
“asphyxia due to compression of the chest and abdomen and that
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

See id. at 495.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 496.
Id.
209 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 500–01.
See id. at 494.
Id. at 500.
Id. at 517–18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
360 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Id. at 448.
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the manner of death was homicide.”184 More than eight years
later, after the medical examiner had acquired “more experience
in the field of forensic pathology,” she re-evaluated the evidence
on which she had based her trial opinion and concluded that she
had been wrong and that the cause and manner of death could
not be determined.185
Furthermore, four other forensic
pathologists also opined that, based on the trial evidence, the
child’s death could not be affirmatively attributed to homicide.186
The petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus
arguing, among other things, that he was denied a right to a fair
trial because his conviction was based on false testimony.187 As a
result, the trial court recommended that the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals grant the petitioner a new trial because “his
due process and due course of law rights were violated, as was
his right to an impartial jury.”188
However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that
due process did not require a new trial because the expert’s prior
testimony had not “been proven to be false.”189 The court
explained that the expert’s “trial testimony is not false just
because her re-evaluation of the evidence has resulted in a
different, ‘undetermined’ opinion, especially when neither she
nor any other medical expert can exclude her original opinion as
the possible cause and manner of death.”190 In other words, there
was no due process violation because petitioner could not
definitively prove that no crime had occurred.
Finally, in Trotter v. State,191 a defendant was convicted of
killing a police officer based on expert testimony that a .357
magnum revolver was used to kill the officer.192 After the
defendant was convicted, the same expert examined the deceased
184

Id. at 450.
Id. at 454.
186
See id. at 454–55.
187
Id. at 454.
188
Robbins, 360 S.W.3d at 457. See generally TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (1876).
The term “remedy by due course of law,” as used in the constitutional provision
guaranteeing to every person a remedy by due course of law for injury done to him in
person or property, means the “reparation for injury ordered by a tribunal having
jurisdiction in due course of procedure after a fair hearing.” Noel v. Menninger
Found., 267 P.2d 934, 943 (Kan. 1954).
189
Id. at 461, 463.
190
Id. at 461.
191
736 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
192
See id. at 538.
185
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officer’s own .38 caliber Smith & Wesson and determined that his
expert trial testimony was wrong.193 Instead, he found that it
was the officer’s own gun that was used to kill the officer, not the
.357 magnum.194 The circuit court and the Missouri Court of
Appeals denied the defendant’s request for a new trial because
the expert’s testimony at trial, though later recanted, was true to
the best of the expert’s knowledge at the time of the trial.195
These courts hold that a new trial is not warranted unless
the expert testimony can be shown to be actually false. In doing
so they place the burden on the convicted defendant to
affirmatively prove that testimony at a given trial is technically
“false” rather than simply factually wrong or unreliable. Thus,
under the actual innocence standard, a criminal defendant may
receive a new trial only if he also proffers fully exonerating
evidence.
III. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL WHEN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO THE CONVICTION BECOMES SO
UNRELIABLE AS TO CALL THE VALIDITY OF THE JURY’S VERDICT
INTO QUESTION
This Part argues that due process requires courts to grant
postconviction relief when scientific evidence in the original trial
is shown to be sufficiently unreliable as to undermine confidence
in the accuracy and integrity of the jury verdict. First, it protects
the defendant’s due process right to a fundamentally fair trial by
eliminating the risk of an inaccurate verdict. Second, it keeps
the burden of proof on the government. Third, policy reasons
dictate that the reasonable probability standard calls for
postconviction relief. Finally, convictions based upon unreliable
evidence are analogous to other evidentiary errors that are
entitled to due process postconviction relief.

193
194
195

See id.
Id.
Id. at 539.
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A.

The “Reasonable Probability Standard” Preserves the
Integrity of the Criminal Justice System by Protecting the
Defendant’s Right to a Fundamentally Fair Trial

1.

Procedural Due Process Rationale

223

Limits on powerful claims that the accuracy and integrity of
a jury verdict have been compromised are not only unjustifiable
but also violate the fundamental premises of the Supreme
Court’s own procedural due process jurisprudence. Most clearly
they violate the calculus in Matthews v. Eldridge for determining
when due process requires a procedure to protect an interest in
life, liberty, or property.196
In Matthews, the court seeks to weigh any costs of an
additional procedure against the expected value of said
procedure.197 The value of the procedure is formulated by
“multipl[ying] the importance of the interest at stake by the
degree to which a particular procedure would increase the
accuracy of determining whether the interest should be
deprived.”198 This benefit should be weighed against the cost of
providing the procedure.199 While one can usually question the
value to be assigned to most interests, “no one doubts the value
in not being executed or in not having to serve a lengthy prison
sentence.”200
When there is a reasonable probability that, had the jury not
heard the unreliable scientific evidence, the result of the
proceeding would have been different, it is plainly unjust to keep
the prisoner incarcerated. Furthermore, because there is a
reasonable probability of the petition’s success, a prisoner’s
liberty has value in excess of the costs associated with litigation
and review of the unreliable scientific evidence. Thus, under the
concepts of fairness and efficiency, an additional procedure is
both socially desirable and also likely required by the cost-benefit
procedural due process test of Matthews.

196

See supra Part I.C.1.
George C. Thomas III et al., Is It Ever Too Late for Innocence? Finality,
Efficiency, and Claims of Innocence, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 263, 293 (2003).
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
197
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Substantive Due Process Rationale

Substantive due process analysis requires identifying the
nature of the liberty interest asserted in a claim of unreliable
scientific evidence. Petitioners claiming that their convictions
were based upon scientific evidence later shown to be unreliable
in their federal habeas petitions argue, at a basic level, that they
were deprived of the fundamental right to a fair trial. The right
to a fair trial is “the most fundamental of all freedoms” and it
must be maintained at all costs.201 The Supreme Court has
described the right to a fair trial as deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition by stating, “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is
a basic requirement of due process.”202 Therefore, if habeas
petitioners can clearly establish that there is a reasonable
probability that the result at trial would have been different had
the jury known the scientific evidence was unreliable, they can
demonstrate an infringement of their interest in being afforded a
fair trial. Given the importance and fundamental nature of this
right, strict judicial review should apply to the AEDPA—the
federal habeas corpus statute—insofar as it impedes a criminal
defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Due process is not a formula but rather a balancing of
interests between the government’s interest in enforcing a
statute and the individual’s interest in the exercise of
fundamental liberties.203 “In order to sustain constitutionality,
the more a statute restricts protected liberty interests, the more
significant the governmental interest must be and the more
narrowly tailored the statute must be.”204 The federal habeas
statute should be held to a strict scrutiny standard to the degree
it prohibits federal habeas courts from considering claims under
the reasonable probability standard because what is being
asserted is a fundamental liberty interest: the right to a fair
trial.205 Under strict scrutiny review, a challenged statute must
be “narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling [government]

201

Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
Id. at 543 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
203
See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 765–68 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (illustrating that due process decisions strike a balance between
individual liberties and society’s demands).
204
Jacobs, supra note 128, at 480.
205
See id. at 480–81.
202
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interest,” and to the degree it fails to meet these requirements,
the statute is an unconstitutional violation of substantive due
process.206
The government has important interests at stake when it
seeks to limit the availability of federal habeas review.207 The
Court has stated, “[f]ederal intrusions into state criminal trials
frustrate both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders
and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.”208
When conviction results from what is believed to be a fair trial,
the State has presumably satisfied the constitutional burden
required to convict the defendant for the charged crime.209
Nevertheless, “the matter is not settled for either the habeas
petitioner who seeks to challenge his conviction[,] or the State
which must respond to a convicted defendant’s claims for
postconviction relief.”210 Because the petitioner has seemingly
been granted all procedural safeguards available both at trial
and during her appeals, the government has supplied significant
process, and a substantial interest in limiting habeas review.211
Yet, when it is later found that scientific evidence, from which
the conviction was based, has been shown to be unreliable, the
need to limit claims under the reasonable probability standard
upon habeas review seems much less compelling.
Even if these “governmental interests are compelling
enough, the denial of such claims is still not narrowly tailored to
achieve those interests” because the same objectives could be
achieved by other means.212 For example, the statute “could
require a finding of a lower court that the underlying conviction
has been called into doubt.”213 This example would be “more
narrowly tailored to the government’s interest in limiting the
availability
of
habeas
review
while
simultaneously
acknowledging the constitutionality of a claim of” reasonable
probability that the trial result would have been different had

206

See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993).
Jacobs, supra note 128, at 481.
208
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 263–65 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).
209
Jacobs, supra note 128, at 482.
210
Id. at 482–83.
211
Id. at 483.
212
Id. at 484.
213
Id.
207

FINAL_IANNECE

226

10/7/2015 7:11 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:195

the jury known the scientific evidence was unreliable.214
Therefore, to the extent that the AEDPA restricts petitioner’s
right to assert his entitlement to a fair trial under this specific
reasonable probability standard, “the statute should fail to
muster constitutionality under strict scrutiny review.”215
B.

The Burden of Proof Throughout a Criminal Matter Should
Remain with the Government

The burden of proof in a criminal prosecution as to all
essential elements of the crime rest upon the prosecution and the
proofs must be such as to convince the trier of the fact beyond a
reasonable doubt.216 If a petitioner were required to disprove an
element of a crime, or prove his actual innocence, the burden of
proof would be turned on its head. The consequences of the
State’s use of unreliable evidence should not fall on the shoulders
of the petitioner. Rather, having used misleading scientific
evidence to convict, the State must bear the burden of retrying
the petitioner in a manner that permits confidence in the
conviction. Furthermore, a petitioner would never be able to
obtain a new trial where forensic science can neither support nor
disprove the conclusion presented to the jury.
C.

Policy Dictates Postconviction Relief

1.

The Reasonable Probability Standard Takes into Account the
Uniquely Persuasive Impact of Scientific Evidence in
Criminal Trials

Criminal convictions increasingly turn on the availability
and strength of scientific evidence offered by the prosecution to
establish that a crime has been committed and that the charged
defendant is the only possible perpetrator. Juries raised on
television programs like CSI expect scientific evidence and, once
that expectation is satisfied, give disproportionate—even
dispositive—weight to that evidence. Thus, once an expert has
indicated that a crime has occurred, the jury likely focuses on
whether it was the defendant who committed the crime instead
of on whether a crime was committed at all. However, if the
214
215
216

Id.
Id.
United States v. Carr, 550 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1977).
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forensic evidence had been presented to the jury accurately, such
evidence certainly would affect how the jury evaluated all of the
evidence against a petitioner.
The reasonable probability standard accounts for the
possibility that juries may have given considerable weight to
scientific evidence that has since been shown to be unreliable. If
convicted defendants can show that scientific evidence has been
discredited so as to undermine confidence in the accuracy and
integrity of the jury verdict, they should be granted relief.
Because of the increasing availability and strength of scientific
evidence offered in criminal prosecutions, this safeguard is
necessary to protect the rights of criminal defendants.
2.

The Reasonable Probability Standard Recognizes That the
Accuracy of the Result Is More Important than Finality of
the Judgment

Concerns over eroding a judgment’s finality are intrinsic to
writs of habeas corpus because every writ granted undermines a
previously final judgment. In the rare instances where scientific
experts revise their conclusion or where newly available evidence
undermines expert testimony from trial, reopening a case that
hinged on the expert’s testimony will help courts keep pace with
science.
Every opinion revised on habeas will present the court
system with two more reviews of the scientific discipline at issue
than otherwise would have occurred. Appellate courts would
inquire into whether change had occurred in the discipline at
issue, and if a significant change had occurred, whether the
Daubert test, when applied in the new trial resulting from
habeas, would be informed by the appellate level decision. In
this light, the Daubert test would necessarily operate differently.
Instead of a proforma application to scientific disciplines long
established, it would be a fresh inquiry into the validity of the
changes that occurred in the discipline. Courts would no longer
lag behind scientific development; rather they would keep pace
with it by regularly exposing it to the rigors of the adversarial
system.
Providing a method that gives effect to the empirical process
would encourage forensic practitioners to be driven by science’s
rapid advancement, rather than act as if they were mere
technicians.
Providing a methodology that recognizes
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development in a scientific field would force practitioners to
actively improve their skills and techniques rather than rely on
outdated certifications and long years of practicing the same
techniques. Therefore, “[i]f a convicted defendant can produce
sufficient indication that the jury’s finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt was wrong, the institutional need for finality
yields to the more compelling concerns of truth and fairness.”217
This compromise should not threaten the criminal justice
system’s responsibility to punish the guilty because “whatever
the truth may be, whether the defendant be guilty or innocent, it
can be established by another trial.”218 In fact, it has been
expressed that while “[f]inality of judgment is essential in
criminal cases, [] so is accuracy of the result—an accurate result
that will stand the test of time and changes in scientific
knowledge.”219
D. Convictions Based upon Scientific Evidence Later Shown To
Be Unreliable Are Analogous to Other Evidentiary Errors
That Are Entitled to Due Process Postconviction Relief
The Supreme Court has long been committed to the principle
that due process forbids the government from obtaining a
conviction through the use of false testimony.220 In fact, “[t]he
development of due process protection against the use of false
testimony has been intertwined with protection against nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence.”221 Because scientific evidence
later shown to be unreliable presents similar fairness problems
to defendants, it should be afforded the same due process
protection.
217

Burr v. Florida, 474 U.S. 879, 881 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Bussey v. State, 64 S.W. 268, 269 (Ark. 1901).
219
Ex Parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (Cochran, J.,
dissenting).
220
See, e.g., White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1945) (acknowledging that
obtaining a conviction through knowing use of perjury violates due process); Hysler
v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 413 (1942) (finding that the prosecution’s complicity in
obtaining a conviction through the use of perjured testimony violates due process);
cf. New York ex rel. Whitman v. Wilson, 318 U.S. 688, 689 (1943) (remanding to
state court to determine whether habeas corpus is available in light of changed law
allowing the state court to set aside a conviction on a showing that a guilty plea was
obtained by fraud where conviction had allegedly been procured through the use of
perjured testimony knowingly used by the prosecution).
221
Anne Bowen Poulin, Convictions Based on Lies: Defining Due Process
Protection, 116 PENN ST. L. REV 331, 336 (2011).
218
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In Mooney v. Holohan,222 the prisoner alleged that his
conviction violated due process because the “prosecuting
authorities” knowingly used perjured testimony, which was the
basis for his conviction.223 The Court condemned the state’s
corruption of the proceeding without considering the precise
requirements for such a due process claim.224 In Brady v.
Maryland,225 the Court granted the defendant a new capital
sentencing hearing because the prosecution had not disclosed
evidence favorable to the defendant bearing on sentencing, thus
establishing that proof of false testimony was not essential to a
due process violation.226 While Brady did not involve false
testimony, the Court labeled its holding as an extension of
Mooney.227 The Court emphasized that Mooney rested on the
“avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused” and not on
“punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor.”228
While requiring some governmental knowledge, the Court
has made it clear that the crux of the wrong is the unfairness of
the proceeding, not the wrongdoing of the prosecutor.229 Thus,
the Court has concluded that “false testimony or non-disclosure
of exculpatory evidence violated . . . due process . . . even when
the prosecutor did not have actual knowledge of the falsity.”230
In Mesarosh v. United States,231 “the Court . . . condemned
reliance on false testimony even though the prosecution had
presented it unknowingly.”232 The Court held that “the dignity of
the United States Government will not permit the conviction of

222

294 U.S. 103 (1935).
Id. at 110.
224
Id. at 112 (stating that due process cannot be satisfied “by mere notice and
hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in
truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured”).
225
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
226
See id. at 84–87 (holding that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution”).
227
Id. at 86.
228
Id. at 87.
229
See id. at 87–88.
230
Poulin, supra note 221, at 338.
231
352 U.S. 1 (1956).
232
Poulin, supra note 221, at 338; Mesarosh, 352 U.S. at 14.
223
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any person on tainted testimony.”233 Furthermore, in Giglio v.
United States,234 the Court recognized that the government’s
failure to correct false testimony could violate due process even
though no one acting for the government actually knew the
testimony was false.235 Like with false testimony, non-disclosure
can violate due process even though the prosecutor was unaware
of exculpatory evidence.236
The Court has also recognized that any false or misleading
testimony may corrupt the truth-finding process and render the
trial unfair.237 The Court has made it clear that a defendant
need not establish perjury to prevail in a false testimony case.238
In Alcorta v. Texas,239 the Court granted relief because the
witness conveyed a false impression even though the testimony
was not clearly false.240 The misleading testimony strengthened
the prosecution’s case, and a more truthful testimony would have
corroborated the defendant’s claim and impeached the witness’s
credibility.241 Similarly, in Napue v. Illinois,242 the Court granted
relief based on false testimony relevant only to impeach the
witness.243
Analogously to false testimony and non-disclosure cases,
cases tried on the basis of scientific evidence later shown to be
unreliable convey false impressions to the jury and may corrupt
the truth-finding process, rendering the trial fundamentally
unfair.
Therefore, scientific evidence later shown to be
unreliable should also be seen as “tainted testimony,” and the
defendant should be protected under the Due Process Clause
even when both the prosecution and the expert presents it
unknowingly.
233
Poulin, supra note 221, at 339 (internal quotation marks omitted); Mesarosh,
352 U.S. at 9.
234
405 U.S. 150 (1972).
235
Id. at 155.
236
See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995) (granting the defendant
relief on the basis of non-disclosure even though the prosecutor did not have all the
exculpatory information until after trial).
237
See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 265 (1959) (granting relief based on
the prosecution’s failure to correct false testimony, which was relevant only to
impeach the witness’s credibility).
238
Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31–32 (1957).
239
355 U.S. 28.
240
See id. at 30–31.
241
Id. at 31–32.
242
360 U.S. 264.
243
Id. at 269–70.
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In both the false testimony and the non-disclosure cases, one
crucial question is whether the false testimony or the undisclosed
exculpatory evidence is “material.”244 The Court has varied the
definition of material depending on the nature of the defendant’s
claim, holding that false testimony claims are subject to a lower
materiality showing than non-disclosure claims.245 The Court
introduced materiality into this line of cases in Brady, stating
that suppression of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution
“violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment.”246
To support a non-disclosure claim, a defendant must
establish a reasonable probability that the result would have
been different had the exculpatory evidence been disclosed.247 In
contrast, a defendant who demonstrates that false testimony was
improperly used at trial is required only to show a reasonable
likelihood that the falsity had an impact on the outcome.248 The
Court equated the reasonable likelihood standard with the
harmless error test.249
The Court stated three reasons for employing a less
demanding materiality standard in false testimony cases in
United States v. Agurs.250 First, obtaining a conviction by the
knowing use of perjury is fundamentally unfair.251 Second, false
testimony cases involve prosecutorial misconduct.252 Third, the
Court asserted that “more importantly . . . they involve a
corruption of the truth-[finding] . . . process.”253
Applying the same standard, to establish a due process
violation based on scientific evidence later shown to be
unreliable, the defendant must show that unreliable scientific
evidence was presented at trial, that the prosecution had the
requisite culpability, and that the scientific evidence was
material. Convicted defendants have been able to show that
244

Poulin, supra note 221, at 342.
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681–82 (1985).
246
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
247
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
248
Id. at 679 n.9.
249
Id. at 679–80 (“[This rule] may . . . easily be stated as a materiality standard
under which the fact that testimony is perjured is considered material unless failure
to disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
250
427 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976).
251
Id. at 103.
252
Id. at 103–04.
253
Id.
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unreliable scientific evidence was presented at trial when an
expert witness withdraws earlier opinions offered at trial because
of mistake or inaccuracy, where newly available evidence
undermines expert testimony from trial, and when an expert
willfully testifies falsely.254 If the prosecution does not have the
requisite culpability—either through actual, constructive, or
imputed knowledge—the unreliable evidence must be held to the
higher materiality showing. Therefore, if the defendant can
establish a “reasonable probability” that the result would have
been different had the jury known the scientific evidence was
unreliable, she should be awarded postconviction relief.
CONCLUSION
Reliable scientific evidence can assist judges and juries in
determining truth and advancing the proper, efficient, and fair
administration of justice.
Unreliable scientific evidence,
however, creates a great potential that the government will
imprison the wrongfully accused. The unreliability of evidence
may be due to forensic fraud, examiner bias or error, invalid
procedures, or well-established methodologies, the soundness of
which is later disproven. Whatever the cause, the result is the
same:
A criminal defendant may be convicted based on
unreliable evidence that should never have been admitted at
trial, but whose unreliability was not known until after the
defendant was convicted.
Due process of law requires a new trial when scientific
evidence necessary to convict becomes so unreliable as to call the
validity of the jury’s verdict into question in order to ensure that
innocent defendants do not fall victim to the inherent
shortcomings of the scientific evidence juries so readily embrace.
Courts should grant federal habeas petitioners relief under the
Due Process Clause when they satisfy the “reasonable
probability” standard for four reasons. First, it will ensure
protection of the petitioners’ procedural and substantive due
process rights to a fundamentally fair trial. Second, it will keep
the burden of proving all elements of a crime on the government.
Third, policy reasons dictate that the reasonable probability
standard calls for postconviction relief. Finally, convictions

254

See supra Introduction.
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based upon unreliable evidence are analogous to other
evidentiary errors that are entitled to due process postconviction
relief.

